OUTLINE OF AFDA'S ONLINE SEMINAR: 

FEDERAL SENTENCING IN FRAUD CASES (AUGUST 2004)

AFDA: http://www.afda.org

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The following is a verbatim transcript of the online seminar presented on the AFDA web site in August 2004:

 

PLEASE CLICK HERE TO ACCESS THE FOLLOWING LINK TO ACCESS THE AUDIO FILE THAT ACCOMPANIES THE SLIDE PRESENTATION:

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AFDA’s Online Seminar
Key Pointers in Handling Federal Sentencing
Proceedings In Fraud Cases Under USSG 2B1.1

AFDA web site:  www.afda.org (Since 1995)

Presentation By: Gregory Nicolaysen
(www.afda.org/gn.htm)

ACCESSING THE AUDIO WILL TAKE A FEW MINUTES. WHILE YOUR COMPUTER IS BUSY ACCESSING THE AUDIO FILE, SOME INTRODUCTORY COMMENTS:

I welcome all of you to our online seminar, and I thank you for taking the time to be here.

A special welcome to those of you attending an AFDA online seminar for the first time.

If this is your first online seminar, please note that all online seminars are free to AFDA members. It's all included in your membership fee.  Membership is only $65 for a six-month period and includes unlimited use of the web site, plus free seminars, and discounts on hotel conference fees and fees to download audio and video files.

Online seminars will be presented once (sometimes twice) per month.

Today’s program will last approx 70 minutes.

The online seminar feature of the AFDA web site operates like a chat room, but it has moderator controls which allow presentations to be conducted without interruptions, and also permit question/answer sessions to managed in an orderly fashion.

If you wish to communicate with me, you can write a message in the white box at the bottom section of the section of the screen, then click where it says "Click Here To Post Your Comments / Questions." You can also Instant Message one another by putting your mouse on the person's name so it's highlighted, then double-clicking. This allows attendees to have private conversations with each other during the presentation.

The format will be the presentation of a series of slides posted in this window, together with an accompanying audio file.

Several slides contain hypertext links to case opinions (and in one slide, a link to a sentencing guideline provision). There are approximately 35 case links.

When you see a case cited in a slide, click the case name. This will activate Acrobat Reader in your hard drive, and the case opinion will appear on your screen. You can save it to your hard drive, so that by the time we are done today, you will have a collection of all the cases from today's program.

Some additional points to cover at the outset:

TRANSCRIPT

You can save a transcript of today's program by clicking the GET TRANSCRIPT button in the lower right hand corner of your screen.  At the completion of the program, click that bar, and a box will appear on your screen prompting you to designate a directory in which to save the file. The transcript file will be saved in HTML format. Wordperfect (and probably Word as well) easily reads HTML files.

CERTIFICATE OF ATTENDANCE

You can receive by email a Certificate of Attendance by following instructions at the end of the program. [not available if you did not attend the online seminar]

WE ARE NOW READY TO BEGIN

By now, the audio file should have loaded on your computer, so we are ready to begin.

Please hit PLAY on your audio player.

Our Thanks To:
U.S. Sentencing Commission
www.ussc.gov
HelpLine: 202-502-4545


We will cover the following topics today:

We will begin with citations to cases that have addressed Blakely in the context of sentencing proceedings in fraud cases.

We will then turn to the sentencing guidelines themselves and address the following checklist of issues re: fraud sentencing under USSG 2B1.1:

  • which edition of the guideline manual should I use? (Ex post facto issues)
  • is the loss amount measurable in money (quantifiable)?
  • is the loss amount reasonably foreseeable?
  • can the loss amount be reasonably estimated?
  • should the loss amount be excluded from calculation?
  • should the loss amount be reduced by credits?
  • is a downward departure warranted: i.e., does the offense level substantially overstate the seriousness of the offense. (Several departure theories will be discussed)
====================================

Post - Blakely: why focus on guidelines?

  1. strategic election: do I want guidelines or indeterminate sentencing?
    • Sarbanes-Oxley: stat max increased to 20 yrs for mail/wire fraud)
    • Statutory max increases since November 1987
  2. alternative sentencing by judges
  3. guidelines as advisory even if no longer binding

 

Cases addressing Blakely in the context of sentencing proceedings in fraud cases:

  • U.S. v. Emmenegger, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15142 (SDNY, August 4, 2004) (wire / securities fraud scheme; sentencing on guilty plea; defendant did not admit facts supporting loss calculation). District Judge Gerard Lynch wrote a lengthy, well-analyzed opinion setting forth alternative sentences under 2B1.1 and a discretionary sentence per Blakely (33 months under the guidelines; 24 months discretionary). The opinion, while concluding that the court will continue to apply the sentencing guidelines until the Supreme Court says otherwise, is worth reading for its analysis of Blakely and its overall synopsis of the post-Blakely era.
  • U.S. v. Einstman, 2004 U.S. Dist LEXIS 13166 (SDNY, July 14, 2004)(mail fraud scheme; sentencing on guilty plea; defendant did admit facts to support loss calculation as part of his guilty plea). The memorandum decision by Judge McMahon reiterates the judge’s previously stated position that the guidelines are unconstitutional (adopting Judge Paul Cassell’s position from the Croxford case). No specific sentence given; rather, the opinion discusses Blakely’s impact on the guidelines and, importantly, discusses the court’s views as to key distinctions between the sentencing scheme in Washington and the federal guidelines, while still coming to the ultimate conclusion that Blakely renders the guidelines unconstitutional).
  • U.S. v. Lamoreaux, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13225 (WD Mo, July 7, 2004)(mail fraud scheme). Not a sentencing issue: here, the district court issued an opinion denying the defendant’s motion to dismiss the fraud indictment per Blakely, holding that while the form of the indictment could have posed some problems for the prosecution at sentencing, Blakely did not support an involuntary dismissal; Blakely did not invalidate indictments but simply affected punishment in certain instances where a jury had not found enhancing factors.
  • U.S. v. Toro, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12763 (D.Conn., July 6, 2004) (false statements per 18 USC 1001; sentencing per guilty plea). Defendant originally sentenced to 24 mos; district court then corrected the sentence down to 15 months; gov appealed and court of appeals remanded with directive to reimpose the 24 month term. In the meantime, Blakely comes down, so defendant moves for resentencing per Blakely, and the district court (in the opinion cited above) elects to apply the severance principle and thus imposes only the base offense level of six months, due to fact that defendant had not admitted facts for the enhancements and there were no jury findings.
  • U.S. v. Mooney, 2004 U.S. App. LEXIS 15301 (8th Cir, July 23, 2004) (mail fraud / securities fraud / money laundering case; convicted after jury trial. Divided 3-judge panel remands for purpose of considering Blakely issue. Two judges find guidelines are unconstitutional; third judge, who authored the opinion, declines to find that Blakely renders guidelines unconstitutional), rehearing en banc granted, 2004 U.S. App. LEXIS 16302 (August 6, 2004).
  • United States v. Lenoci, 2004 U.S. App. LEXIS 15530 (2d Cir., July 28, 2004) (bribery / fraud by public official re: intangible services. Affirms district court's imposition of sentence per guidelines, but stays issuance of mandate pending further guidance from Circuit / Supreme Court).
  • U.S. v. Morgan, 2004 U.S. App. LEXIS 15286, footnote 2 (9th Cir., June 7, 2004)(bank fraud / making false statements; Circuit observed that district court properly sentenced defendant under guidelines in effect at time of offense conduct which pre-dated November 2001 amendments, as those amendments “substantially increased the penalties for bank fraud”).

PRACTICE POINTER:

First issue re: loss calculation:

Which guideline edition to use?

* ex post facto issues

Ex Post Facto Issues:  U.S.S.G. 1B1.11:

(a) The court shall use the Guidelines Manual IN EFFECT ON THE DATE THAT THE DEFENDANT IS SENTENCED.

(b) (1) If the court determines that use of the Guidelines Manual in effect on the date that the defendant is sentenced would violate the ex post facto clause of the United States Constitution, the court shall use the Guidelines Manual in effect on the date that the offense of conviction was committed.

U.S. v. Morgan, 2004 U.S. App. LEXIS 15286, footnote 2 (9th Cir., June 7, 2004)
(bank fraud / making false statements; Circuit observed that district court properly sentenced defendant under guidelines in effect at time of offense conduct which pre-dated November 2001 amendments, as those amendments “substantially increased the penalties for bank fraud”).

Ex Post Facto: No Picking & Choosing

1B1.11(b)(2):

The Guidelines Manual in effect on a particular date SHALL BE APPLIED IN ITS ENTIRETY. The court shall not apply, for example, one guideline section from one edition of the Guidelines Manual and another guideline section from a different edition of the Guidelines Manual.

Which Guideline Edition To Use?

Key Changes Begin in November 2001
Amendment 617 (effective 11/01/01)
Expanded in 2002, 2003

  • New Base Offense Level
  • 2B1.1 incorporates 2F1.1
  • Loss table increased
  • New Specific Offense Characteristics (SOCs)

Which Guideline Edition To Use?

2002: Sarbanes-Oxley Act

  • increases statutory maximum to 20 yrs for mail / wire fraud [Blakely implications]

2003: emergency amendments (January 25)

  • incorporates Sarbanes-Oxley
  • enhancements for officers / directors of publicly-traded companies / jeopardizing economic stability of company

2003: November 1: regular amendments

Which Guideline Edition To Use?

2001-2003 Editions:

  • New Base Offense Level to 2B1.1
    • 2000: 4
    • 2001: 6
    • 2003: 7, if statutory max is 20 yrs or more
  • mail / wire fraud (Sarbanes-Oxley)
  • plead to 18 USC 371 / 1001: 5-yr max

One-level could mean the critical difference of:

Zone A vs B
Zone B vs C
Zone C vs D

2001-2003 Editions: New SOCs in 2B1.1

(b)(2), App Notes 1, 4

Number of victims / mass marketing:  +2 to +6 levels

KEY: ACTUAL LOSS TO VICTIM REQUIRED

Cases to note:

U.S. v. Magnuson, 307 F.3d 333 (5th Cir. 2003)

U.S. v. Olshan, 371 F.3d 1296 (11th Cir. 2004)
(mass marketing includes solicitations from existing client base; does not require general public)

2001-2003 Editions: New SOCs in 2B1.1

(b)(8), App Note 7: "Sophisticated Means"

Complex or especially intricate offense conduct pertaining to execution / concealment of offense.

  • hiding assets / transactions
  • fictitious entities / corporate shells
  • offshore accounts

Case to note:

U.S. v. Rettenberger, 344 F.3d 702 (7th Cir. 2003) (enhancement applies where defendant misrepresented physical condition to neurologist and several insurers to feign disability)

2001-2003 Editions: New SOCs in 2B1.1

(b)(12), App Note 12: expands upon 2000 edition:

Offense substantially jeopardized solvency / financial security of:

  • Financial institution
  • Publicly traded company
  • Company having 1,000+ employees
  • 100 or more victims

Definition of “Financial Institution”

Enhancement not limited to traditional banks. "Financial institution" applies where:

U.S. v. Savin, 349 F.3d 27 (2d Cir. 2003) (company is substantially engaged in business of investigating in securities of other companies).
U.S. v. Dale, 374 F.3d 321 (5th Cir. 2004) (company presents itself to victims as investment company and sells securities, and is a sham)
U.S. v. Collins, 361 F.3d 343 (7th Cir. 2004) (entity is sham investment company)
But note: U.S. v. Miles, 360 F.3d 472 (5th Cir. 2004) (Medicare is not a financial institution)

2001-2003 Editions: New SOCs in 2B1.1

(b)(13), App Note 12: Officers / Directors / Brokers

+4 if violation of securities law AND defendant was officer / director / registered broker / investment advisor

NO REQUIREMENT RE: CONVICTION OF SECURITIES LAW

Post-Blakely Strategy:
Sentencing Jury vs. Indeterminate Sentencing

Indeterminate: watch those statutory maximums
Severance / sentencing jury: can gov prove BRD:

  • loss amount
  • sophisticated means
  • endangering solvency / financial security
  • violation of securities law

Post-Blakely Strategy:
Sentencing Jury vs. Indeterminate Sentencing

Not just burden: also METHOD of proof by gov

KEY: does FRE 1101(d)(3) apply post-Blakely?
[rules of evidence don’t apply in sentencing]
   * hearsay (multiple) / opinion

Calculating The Loss Amount

2B1.1, App Note 3(A) [2003 ed]:

"loss is the greater of actual loss or intended loss"

COMPARE: RESTITUTION

RESTITUTION WILL BE THE SUBJECT OF A SEPARATE AFDA ONLINE SEMINAR IN OCTOBER 2004

Calculating Actual Loss: Causation Standard

2001 - 2003 editions (App Note 2, 3):

“‘Actual loss’ means the reasonably foreseeable pecuniary harm that resulted from the offense.”
[emphasis added]

"reasonably foreseeable pecuniary harm" means pecuniary harm that the defendant knew or, under the circumstances, reasonably should have known, was a potential result of the offense.

Calculating Actual Loss: Causation Standard

KEY: Not simply a “but-for” standard

The old 2F1.1 used “reasonably foreseeable” language only in limited context (e.g., product substitution)

* reliance on case law re: causation / circuit split

IRONY: 2001-2003 guidelines incorporate RF standard

  • provide stricter causation standard
  • better for defense re: loss if no other enhancements

Foreseeability, cont’d

Practice Pointer: the 2-step process under USSG 1B1.3 (this is a link you can click)

Argue reasonable foreseeability under 2B1.1 in conjunction with the 2-step process set forth under the Relevant Conduct guideline, 1B1.3(a)(1)(B), pertaining to vicarious liability for the conduct of co-participants.

Application Note 2 to 1B1.3 (this is a link you can click) teaches that a defendant is accountable for the conduct (acts and omissions) of others that was both: (i) in furtherance of the jointly undertaken criminal activity; and (ii) reasonably foreseeable in connection with that criminal activity.

The application note explains that the first step is to "determine the scope of the criminal activity the particular defendant agreed to jointly undertake (i.e., the scope of the specific conduct and objectives embraced by the defendant’s agreement). The conduct of others that was both in furtherance of, and reasonably foreseeable in connection with, the criminal activity jointly undertaken by the defendant is relevant conduct under this provision. The conduct of others that was not in furtherance of the criminal activity jointly undertaken by the defendant, or was not reasonably foreseeable in connection with that criminal activity, is not relevant conduct under this provision."

Applying these points to fraud cases, it is advantageous for the defense to argue that before even addressing reasonable foreseeability, the Court should find that the loss amount at issue falls outside the scope of the criminal activity which your client agreed to jointly undertake. If the Court agrees with that, then it is not necessary to reach the issue of reasonable foreseeability.

Because certain circuits had applied a “but for” causation standard prior to the November 2001 amendments, the government could meet its burden on proving fraud loss under the old 2F1.1 without being subject to the 2-step analysis of the Relevant Conduct guideline. The November 2001 amendments brought the standard of causation under 2B1.1 in line with the Relevant Conduct guideline.

Jointly undertaken activity: 1B1.3(a)(1)(B)

    Practice Pointer: better to go with 1B1.3(a)(1)(A) rather than (a)(1)(B)

In negotiating plea deals, try to get the government to agree to limit the loss amount to the monetary loss caused as a direct result of the client's onduct. This avoids the Relevant Conduct analysis discussed above, and thus avoids having to address “reasonable foreseeability”, because loss caused by the client’s conduct does not pertain to losses generated by co-participants.

Limiting loss in a plea deal to monetary loss caused by the client’s conduct brings into play a different subsection of the Relevant Conduct guideline, 1B1.3(a)(1)(A), which makes the defendant liable at sentencing for "all acts and omissions committed, aided, abetted, counseled, commanded, induced, procured, or willfully caused by the defendant".

If you achieve an (a)(1)(A) plea deal, don’t argue reasonable foreseeability in your sentencing memorandum because it’s irrelevant.
See, U.S. v. Barclay, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10513 (SDNY, June 8, 2004)(plea deal limited loss amount to loss caused by defendant's conduct, thus making reasonable foreseeability moot).

Bottom line: in handling causation issues, aim for a loss amount under 1B1.3(a)(1)(A), rather than 1B1.3(a)(1)(B).
If gov will agree to this, an important objective has been met.

Exception To Reasonable Foreseeability Standard:
Computer Crimes: 18 U.S.C. 1030

App Note 3(A)(v)(III):
Actual loss includes the following pecuniary harm, regardless whether it was reasonably foreseeable:

Reasonable cost to any victim:

  • cost of responding to offense
  • cost of conducting damage assessment
  • cost of restoring data, program, system, or information to its condition prior to the offense

Any revenue lost, cost incurred, or other damages incurred because of interruption of service

Calculating Actual Loss: App. Note 3(A)(iii)

KEY FOR DEFENSE: Definition of Pecuniary Harm

* means harm that is monetary or that otherwise is readily measurable in money.

Thus, does NOT include:

  • emotional distress
  • harm to reputation
  • other non-economic harm

Non-Monetary Harm: Risk of Upward Departure

App. Note 18(A): examples of reasons to depart:

  • primary objective of offense was aggravating, non-monetary goal, eg, inflict emotional harm
  • offense caused / risked substantial non-monetary harm, eg, caused physical harm, psychological harm, or severe emotional trauma, or resulted in substantial invasion of privacy interest

Calculating Actual Loss: Estimate
App. Note 3(C):

 “The court need only make a reasonable estimate of the loss”

Calculating Actual Loss: Estimate: App. Note 3(C)

In 1995, District Judge Jack Weinstein wrote a very detailed opinion addressing the standards for making the estimations under the sentencing guidelines. The case involved drug smuggling and thus specifically dealt with the estimation of drug quantities; however, the analysis in the opinion branches out to discuss non-drug cases, specifically fraud cases under the old 2F1.1.

U.S. v. Shonubi, 895 F. Supp 460, 474-75 (EDNY 1995), cited with approval in
U.S. v. Emmenegger, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15142 (SDNY, August 4, 2004)

Factors Include
(focus on valuation methodology):

  • fair market value of property taken or destroyed
  • cost of repairs to damaged property
  • approx # of victims X average loss to each victim
  • reduced value of equity securities or other corporate assets

Calculating Intended Loss: App. Note 3(A)(ii)
Key addition in 2001 amendments

“ ‘Intended loss’ (I) means the pecuniary harm that was intended to result from the offense; and (II) includes intended pecuniary harm that would have been impossible or unlikely to occur (e.g., as in a government sting operation, or an insurance fraud in which the claim exceeded the insured value).”

Focus: subjective intent of defendant

Calculating Intended Loss:
App. Note 3(A)(ii)
Change Brought By 2001 Amendments

Pre-November 2001: Circuit split

Some circuits had vacated sentences where "the total intended loss bore no relation to “economic reality” if defendant’s plan had no chance of success.
Case to note:
United States v. Fleming, 128 F.3d 285 (6th Cir. 1997)

Intended loss and Blakely:

United States v. Penaranda, 2004 U.S. App. LEXIS 14268 (2d Cir., July 12,2004, en banc) (Circuit certifies three questions to the Supreme Court per Blakely. Opinion recognizes that among the myriad of guideline factors that are affected by Blakely is the issue of intended loss).

Calculating Intended Loss

App. Note 3(A)(ii)

“(II) includes intended pecuniary harm that would have been impossible or unlikely to occur”

Section II sets an explicit rule on this hotly-contested issue under old 2F1.1

New rule: impossibility of success is irrelevant

Intended loss and bank fraud:

U.S. v. Munoz-Franco, 307 F. Supp. 2d 340 (D.P.R. 2004)

Calculating Intended Loss: health care fraud

U.S. v. Miller, 316 F.3d 495 (4th Cir. 2003)
(intended loss is amounts billed to Medicare-aid, regardless of whether it was possible to be paid under the program; case decided under 2F1.1)
U.S. v. Raithatha, 368 F.3d 618, 629 (6th Cir. 2004)
(Convicted under 18 USC 1347: defrauding insurers / Medicare-aid) (intended loss is amount of personal expenses passed off as legitimate patient-related expenses)

Note: possible downward departure re: impossibility

example: U.S. v. Nachamie, 121 F. Supp. 2d 285 (SDNY 2000)
(doctors indicted for fraudulent billing scheme against Medicare; intended loss calculated based on what was billed, regardless of what Medicare actually paid; but court departs downward. NOTE: the case was decided under the old 2F1.1).

Calculating Intended Loss: App. Note 3(A)(ii)
Change Brought By 2001 amendments

Practice Pointer:

Under new law: move for departure re: “economic reality” doctrine

(We will discuss this departure theory a bit later)

Calculating Actual Loss: Amounts Excluded

* Note 3(A)(iii): pecuniary harm: “measurable in money”

* Note 3(D): Even if measurable, these expense categories are excluded from loss analysis:

(i) Interest of any kind, finance charges, late fees, penalties, amounts based on an agreed-upon return or rate of return, or other similar costs.
(ii) Costs to the government of, and costs incurred by victims primarily to aid the government in, the prosecution and criminal investigation of an offense.

U. S. v. Morgan, 2004 U.S. App. LEXIS 15286 (9th Cir., July 23, 2004)
(per 2B1.1, district court district court erred in including interest and finance charges in its calculation of actual loss for sentencing purposes).

Calculating Actual Loss: Amounts Credited

Note 3(E):

To credit: to reduce loss figure by the amount of the credit.

Different from excluding a cost/expense category

Focus on benefits to victim prior to detection

  • money returned
  • FMV of property returned
  • services rendered
  • collateral pledged

Amounts Credited Against Loss:
   
Benefits transferred by defendant to victim

“Time of detection” is key test in Note 3(E):

KEY TEST:

What was FMV of property returned / services rendered to victim prior to the time of detection?

CAUTION FOR DEFENSE: Depreciation in FMV will reduce credit

Amounts Credited Against Loss

Collateral pledged / provided by defendant:

  • amount the victim has recovered at time of sentencing from disposition of collateral, OR
  • if collateral has not been disposed of by that time, the fair market value of collateral at the time of sentencing

KEY FOR DEFENSE:

you can get credit for increases in value of real estate during pendency of prosecution.

example: mortgage fraud cases

Special Rules re: Loss Calculation: Note 3(F)

LIMIT ON CREDIT:

Ponzi / Investment Fraud Schemes:

“loss shall not be reduced by the money or the value of the property transferred to any individual investor in the scheme in excess of that investor’s principal investment (i.e., the gain to an individual investor in the scheme shall not be used to offset the loss to another individual investor in the scheme).”

Example:

Defendant defrauds Victim A into investing $100,000, and Victim B into investing $50,000. In the course of scheme, Defendant pays back to Victim A $20,000 and $60,000 to Victim B. The loss to Victim A is $80,000 (100 - 20), and $0 to Victim B. Don’t apply the $10,000 profit to Victim B as a credit against loss to Victim A.

 

Special Rules re: Loss Calculation: Note 3(F)

Fraudulent regulatory approval schemes

NO CREDIT for value of items re: scheme in which:

“goods for which regulatory approval by a government agency was required but not obtained, or was obtained by fraud”

Bottom Line: Loss includes amount paid for property or goods transferred or misrepresented. No credits for value received by victim.

Special Rules re: Loss Calculation: Note 3(F)

Fraudulent professional services schemes

NO CREDIT for value of services re: scheme in which:

“services were fraudulently rendered to the victim by persons falsely posing as licensed professionals”

Bottom Line: Loss includes amount paid for services rendered or misrepresented. No credits for value received by victim.


Special Rules re: Loss Calculation: Note 3(F)

Stolen / Counterfeit credit cards:

Loss includes any unauthorized charges and shall not be less than $500 per card.

Downward Departures in Loss Calculation

KEY: departure language built into App Note 18(C)

  • no need to argue per 5K2
“There may be cases in which the offense level determined under this guideline substantially overstates the seriousness of the offense. In such cases, a downward departure may be warranted.”

PRACTICE POINTER:

Depart from final offense level, not from loss amount

* do a complete 2B1.1 analysis (all SOCs, not just loss calculation)

Cases to note:

U.S. v. McBride, 362 F.3d 360 (6th Cir. 2004):

"We agree, however, with the observation by one district court that "because the loss determination essentially dictates the severity of the sentence, it is this determination that will almost always be the subject of departure scrutiny." United States v. Roen, 279 F. Supp. 2d 986, 990 (E.D. Wisc. 2003)

Downward Departures Theories re: Loss

"Multiple Causation" Scenario

U.S. v. Forchette, 220 F. Supp. 2d 914 (ED Wisc 2002)
(amount of loss is product of several sources; loss amount inflated by factors, such as an economic downturn, a market collapse, or negligence by victims, which are beyond defendant's control)

"Economic Reality" Principle

U.S. v. McBride, 362 F.3d 360 (6th Cir. 2004)
United States v. Roen, 279 F. Supp. 2d 986, 990 (E.D. Wisc. 2003)
U.S. v. Forchette, 220 F. Supp. 2d 914 (ED Wisc 2002)

(key factors: defendant's scheme is doomed to fail or has little chance of producing any actual loss; substantial disparity between actual and intended loss)

But see, U.S. v. Ravelo, 370 F.3d 266 (2d Cir. 2004)
("The district court's finding that Ravelo's intended loss included all of his attempts to draw down money on the credit cards even though it was in fact impossible for him to have drawn down more than the actual cash- advance limit of the cards is therefore not clearly erroneous on this score.")

"Cumulative Effects" Principle

Focus: 2B1.1 enhancements overlap to such a degree that court will depart downward.

U.S. v. Laurson, 362 F.3d 160 (2d Cir. 2004)
U.S. v. Savin, 349 F.3d 27 (2d Cir. 2003)
(departure granted due to overlap between enhancement for loss and enhancement for affecting financial institution. Note: Laurson court agrees no impermissible double-counting; still departs)

Extraordinary Restitution

U.S. v. Kim, 364 F.3d 1235 (11th Cir. 2004) [good cites]
(extraordinary restitution is only discouraged, not forbidden, factor, even if paid after adjudication of guilt; circuit split; wide range of factors determine if restitution payment was extraordinary enough, "such as the degree of voluntariness, the efforts to which a defendant went to make restitution, the percentage of funds restored, the timing of the restitution, and whether the defendant's motive demonstrates sincere remorse and acceptance of responsibility.")

Unusual Nature of Fraudulent Conduct or Defendant's Role (pre-dates 2001 amendments)

1) D had limited or inferior role in the fraud that bore little relationship to amount of loss
2) D had little or no knowledge of the amount being taken, such that it would be unfair to attribute entire amount of loss to him
3) D's intent in involving himself in scheme was significantly different than of the usual fraud defendant, e.g.,

  • entered the scheme with honest intentions or with intent to make good on his obligations
  • fraudulent representation was of limited materiality (eg, could have obtained a loan by truthful means but at higher interest rate; or the defendant's fraud may have been for little or no gain, especially in comparison to the size of the loss

Cases to note:

U.S. v. Forchette, 220 F.Supp. 2d 914 (ED WI 2002)
U.S. v. Brennick, 134 F.3d 10 (1st Cir. 1998)
U.S. v. Broderson, 67 F.3d 452 (2d Cir. 1995)
U.S. v. Monaco, 23 F.3d 793 (3d Cir. 1994)

SUMMARY OF SEMINAR:

Defense Checklist re: Loss Calculation


That completes today's online program.
I'm Greg Nicolaysen, thanking you for taking the time to attend.
Before you log off, I will repeat points mentioned at the outset of this program: 


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Until next time, I send everyone my warmest regards. 

I welcome you to
Send me your comments by email to this address: 

Greg Nicolaysen:   greg@afda.org

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Association of Federal Defense Attorneys (AFDA)
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This file was created in August 2004
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